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ON A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
Michael . Lightfoot*
This has not been all that easy, thinking back over thirty-two
years of criminal practice, trying to define the role of the criminal
defense lawyer in our system of justice. My initial thoughts were
very traditional ones, probably not too different than what I
thought coming out of law school: that in our adversary system a
defense lawyer must use all his1 energies, talents, and intellect,
within the bounds of ethics, to defend his client and that neither
the nature of the accusation nor the popularity of the client or his
cause matters one whit. But like most things in life, that answer is
too simple. For, in reality, the defense lawyer's role today, particu-
larly in representing federal defendants, is quite different than it
was twenty or thirty years ago. That role change has taken place
gradually, slowly shaped by strong forces at work in our society.
The average person-in-the-street is now fed up with crime and
criminals. She is not interested in hearing the reasons behind the
escalation in violence. Nor does she have any tolerance for deal-
ing with criminals other than with swift, no-nonsense justice. She
simply wants to lock up the criminals for as long as possible and
keep them out of her neighborhood-a simple solution to a com-
plex problem. The politicians have listened carefully and have
passed laws in response that may be long on appeal to their con-
stituents, but are short on perspective. In doing so, they have up-
set the checks and balances in the criminal justice system and ma-
terially altered the roles of the prosecutor, judge, and defense
attorney. From where I sit, the changes have not been healthy.
I came out of law school during a period that one legal com-
mentator aptly called the Due Process Revolution. It was the
1960s, a heady time when blockbuster constitutional cases were
* Michael J. Lightfoot is a partner at Talcott, Lightfoot, Vandevelde &
Sadowsky in Los Angeles.
1. In conjunction with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review's gender neutrality
policy, certain genders have been assigned in this Article. The average person-in-
the-street will be female, the defense attorney male, the prosecutor female, the de-
fendant male, and the judges female. Eds.
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being decided in rapid succession by the Warren Court. Law en-
forcement officers and prosecutors were being put to the test, fac-
ing obstacles never presented before. The Bill of Rights had come
alive. Confessions could not be used unless the police gave a
warning of constitutional fights and got a clear waiver of those
fights from the defendant.2 Lawyers were now required to be pre-
sent at the defendant's shoulder rendering effective assistance at
each critical stage.3 Rigorous rules applied to search warrants and
the obtaining of evidence.4 Constitutional violations sometimes
resulted in the loss of evidence." Prosecutors had to disclose ex-
culpatory evidence.6
In my view, this revolution introduced a much needed meas-
ure of equity and fairness to a process that is fundamentally
weighted against a criminal defendant. For anyone without first-
hand experience of the criminal justice system, it is hard to appre-
ciate the full weight of governmental power and authority that is
brought to bear on an individual who is charged with a crime. My
first courtroom appearances were as a federal prosecutor. I re-
member being awestruck at the amount of power my colleagues
and I, as young inexperienced lawyers, had been given. We could
alter the course of a person's life in making the sometimes hair-
thin decision whether to file or decline to file charges and were in-
strumental in deciding whether release on bail was appropriate.
While the sentencing decision was obviously up to the judge, the
prosecutor's input was often very influential.
I soon saw and understood the trepidations felt by a defendant
on being brought into the criminal system. Appearances before
many judges were as pleasant as could be expected under the cir-
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966) (holding that absent other
effective measures to protect Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, a
person in custody must be warned prior to interrogation that the person has certain
rights, including the right to remain silent).
3. See e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (stating that pre-trial
identification is a critical stage of the prosecution at which the accused is as much
entitled to such aid of counsel as at the trial itselo.
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see also Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(holding that evidence of accused's conversations overheard by attaching an elec-
tronic listening device to the telephone booth in which accused placed his calls was
excluded because the search was conducted without a warrant); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding inadmissable letters and private documents
seized during a warrantless search).
6. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963).
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cumstances; clients were treated with respect. But that was not
always the case. The trappings of some courtrooms, as well as the
demeanor of the courtroom personnel, could be very off-putting;
the tone was almost funereal-long faces, musty odors, dark pur-
ple wall hangings behind the judges. One elderly judge even kept
the temperature at what seemed to be just above freezing; the
story was that they hadn't had time to embalm him yet. It was all
quite intimidating. The process itself did not lighten the experi-
ence. In fact, it did not take a whole lot-one turn around the
criminal justice track was normally enough-for a defendant to
appreciate how cold and one-sided the system could be.
I joined the Federal Public Defender's Office in Los Angeles
when it first opened in 1971. For the first time federal prosecutors
faced a steady diet of prepared adversaries who were paid for their
services. Defense lawyers now had full-time investigators; it was
not rare for a government witness to be impeached with a state-
ment obtained by the defense investigator. Expert witnesses ap-
peared more regularly for the defense as the courts held that the
indigent accused was as entitled to the same help as the defendant
who could hire a lawyer, whether it be a competent psychiatrist in
whose selection the prosecution would have no influence,7 a hand-
writing expert, an accountant, or a savvy investigator." Prosecutors
in turn were regularly having to face defense witnesses for the first
time, getting the same opportunity to hone their cross-examination
skills as defense lawyers always had. It was a healthy system that
had matured to a point where there was vigorous advocacy on
both sides. Defense lawyers were performing the function envis-
aged by the Sixth Amendment. 9
I don't want to create the false impression here that defen-
dants were being acquitted with regularity. That certainly wasn't
the case. In fact, it was still true that as a defense lawyer you lost
7. United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1973).
8. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996); see also
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the right of an indigent de-
fendant in a criminal trial to have the assistance of counsel is a fundamental right es-
sential to a fair trial).
9. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fence.").
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most of the time. That had always been par for the course. But
there was the exhilaration of having fought a hard, fair fight,
knowing that you had forced the government to do things right.
Over the past twenty years, that hard, fair fight has changed
dramatically. While it may be difficult to pinpoint specific causes
for the change, the public mood I mentioned earlier has certainly
played a major role. Across society, there has been a growing an-
tipathy towards the poor and the disadvantaged. Recently, aliens
and immigrants have become particularly disfavored, as evidenced
by the passage of Proposition 187 in California and other similar
attempts to keep the have-nots from entering the mainstream of
American society."0
With respect to criminal cases, the public has increasingly per-
ceived the system as unfairly favoring the defendant. It has be-
come conventional wisdom in some circles that with all the rights
accorded the accused by the Warren Court, defendant after defen-
dant has been acquitted or otherwise escaped justice because of
hypertechnicalities, sneaky defense lawyer tactics, or weak-kneed
judges. That is a misconception. Those with experience in the sys-
tem will tell you that that simply has not been the case and, if any-
thing, the changes brought about have served to improve the sys-
tem, from both defense and prosecutorial perspectives.
Nevertheless, the misconception is still alive. It has, in turn, cre-
ated a politics of punishment where elected officials have suc-
cumbed to the public demand for harsher laws in general, the en-
actment of broader criminal prohibitions, and more severe
punishments.
Ironically, the clients I now represent who have found the sys-
tem to be particularly one-sided are the conservative businessmen
who, but for their brush with the law, would be the first to com-
plain about how defense-oriented the courts have become. It is in-
conceivable to them that law enforcement officers can decide uni-
laterally whether an individual will be arrested and lose his liberty.
Why, they ask, wasn't the defendant provided an opportunity to
present exculpatory evidence to some neutral person before his
freedom was taken away. They are incredulous that a single police
officer is free to make an arrest and ruin a person's reputation.
They conclude that law enforcement agents have become immune
10. See e.g., Faye Fiore, Welfare Reform Bolsters Prop. 187, Governor Says., L.A.
TIMEs, Sept. 11, 1996, at A3.
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over time to the devastation the charge itself can cause. And even
in a grand jury system where your fellow citizens ostensibly stand
between the accused and a criminal charge, the defendant is nor-
mally neither entitled to present any exculpatory evidence nor
have a lawyer present simply to observe the proceedings, much
less address the charging body and explain the defendant's side of
things.
The sense of one-sidedness gets even worse after the client
makes his first court appearance. He will learn fast enough that,
although there are always exceptions, he will find few friends in
the system. It was bad enough that the FBI agent, who had first
acted like his best friend, turned out to be anything but. The jail-
ers will treat him with cold inhumanity. And some court personnel
will have become so jaded by the system that they will automati-
cally assume that he, like most everyone else charged with a crime,
is guilty. Worse, it is not infrequent that a judge will abandon the
independence she vowed to exercise when she took office and take
the path of least resistance, bowing without serious thought to the
suggestions and importunings of the prosecutor. This is especially
true of some elected judges who fully appreciate both the power of
prosecutors' associations and how devastating one unpopular de-
cision reported in the local news could be at election time. The
suggestion that judging civil and criminal cases is much the same
experience is not necessarily true. I recall a judge telling the story
of moving to a civil calendar after many years of having exclusively
handled criminal cases. She asked a colleague who had recently
made the same transition what to expect. He replied that the civil
cases are really no different than the criminal ones except that
when the parties in the civil cases introduce themselves, you don't
know which one is supposed to win.
This is the context in which that traditional definition of the
defense lawyer's role-the one I learned in law school-is rooted.
The accused's lawyer is the one person who stands between him
and the cold reality, the full force and weight, of the system. The
overriding responsibility of the criminal defense attorney is to fight
off the advances of those who would take advantage and to boldly
assert and vigorously pursue the client's defenses.
Recently, legislatures have put significantly more power in the
hands of prosecutors who, as a result, have taken on a much more
prominent role than they ever have in the past. Judges, at the
same time, have suffered a significant loss of power. These
November 19961
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changes have also drastically affected the role of the defense law-
yer so that the assistance given a client today, particularly in fed-
eral court, is markedly different than when I started. Unless that
imbalance is corrected, it is going to have a seriously detrimental
effect on our criminal justice system well into the future.
California is a good example, both in the state and federal
courts, of the extent of power now available to the prosecutor.
Everyone knows about the state's new "three-strikes" law and the
draconian mandatory sentences that can be imposed for relatively
minor, nonviolent third strike convictions." County prosecutors
unilaterally decide when to pursue third strikes. The discretion
exercised varies with the county. Federal prosecutors have been
accorded similar discretion in deciding whether or not to lodge
charges carrying mandatory sentences. That in itself is an ex-
traordinary power when you consider that a teenager can be sen-
tenced to a mandatory thirty year sentence in federal court for a
drug offense that would have carried the possibility of a proba-
tionary sentence if it had been filed in state court. But the real
power of the federal prosecutor today emanates from the federal
sentencing process, which, since 1987, has been governed by the
Sentencing Guidelines. 2 These Guidelines virtually rob the judge
of the discretion that used to be the hallmark of the process. Some
judges have protested by resigning. Many, probably most, of the
rest decry the Guidelines, rightly pointing out that the critically
important job of sentencing could be done as readily by a com-
puter.
This is how the Guidelines work. Virtually every conceivable
sentencing factor, negative and positive, has supposedly been con-
templated, codified, and assigned a value. 3 A numerical tally then
predetermines a narrow range within which the judge must pick a
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(a) (West Supp. 1996); see also Gordon Dillow,
Pizza Case Unlikely Focus of 'Three Strikes' Debate, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1994, at
B1; Eric Slater, Man Guilty in Potential 'Three Strikes' Pizza Case, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
21, 1995, at B1.
12. Sentencing Guidelines Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59 (1994).
13. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, 1-10 (Nov. 1995).
One particularly disturbing aspect of the process worked out by the Sentencing
Commission is that the very factors, such as age, mental, emotional and physical
problems, employment record, family ties and military, civic, charitable and public
service, which had always been thought to be core considerations in fashioning a fair
sentence, have now been declared "factors... not ordinarily relevant to the deter-
mination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range."
Id. at 304.
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specific sentence."' The result of all this is that the defense lawyer
will determine very early in the representation what the Guideline
range will be if his client is convicted. All you need do is take out
the Guidelines grid and your calculator. You will end up with a
time period, for example, thirty-seven to forty-six months, within
which the judge must select a specific period of incarceration."
Because parole has been abolished in the federal system, the de-
fendant will invariably serve at least 85% of the sentence.
There is only one way out of this strait jacket-by way of
Guidelines section 5K1, which gives the prosecutor the unilateral
power to seek a downward departure if she decides that the defen-
dant has earned it by cooperation, i.e., "substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution of another person."' 6 Cooperation
is the only basis upon which the motion can be made. Neither the
defense lawyer nor the judge, acting sua sponte, can make the mo-
tion. It is solely within the discretion of the prosecutor. A client
may do everything within his or her ability to assist the govern-
ment in making cases against others. By any objective standard it
may be substantial; yet, the prosecutor is free to determine that it
is not enough. Where that happens the defendant's only recourse
is to prove that the prosecutor's refusal was made in bad faith. In
most courts that is an almost insurmountable burden.
These prosecutorial weapons achieve results that do not ad-
vance legitimate criminal justice goals. First, they seriously neu-
tralize the sentencing function of the judge in fitting the punish-
ment to the individual defendant. In the past we trusted the
ultimate decision as to the defendant's fate to the hands of an ob-
jective arbiter after a full review of all the facts. While it was true
that that system did produce disparate results at times, those were
not nearly as draconian as what has been produced by the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. Consistency is certainly a goal to be strived for,
but a fair sentence must be tailored to the particular circumstances
of each defendant.
Now the ultimate arbiter turns out to be the prosecutor, the
one who selects the charges. In general, these are decent, bright
young lawyers, but they are often times fairly recent law school
graduates with a minimum of legal experience, rarely in my expe-
rience any criminal defense experience, and, more significantly,
14. Id. at 11.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 309.
November 1996]
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seriously lacking in life experience. Many are very well-
intentioned but even the most right-minded cannot help but be
significantly affected by this awesome power. God help you if
you're unlucky and you happen to draw a mean-spirited prosecu-
tor who is not too bright. The checks and balances assumed to be
inherent in the system soon fade because there is really little
"check" on the prosecutor's wielding of power. In many cases, the
prosecutor, more than the judge, can determine the defendant's
fate.
The most insidious feature of the Guidelines is that they
emasculate the legitimate function of the defense lawyer in engag-
ing in the hard, fair fight that is the essence of the adversary sys-
tem. In many situations where, in the past, the prosecutor and de-
fense lawyer would have fought out factual disputes in the
courtroom as two vigorous advocates, now the defense lawyer
cannot take the risk. Let me give you recent examples where
charges carried such potentially severe sentences that defense
counsel were forced to abandon arguably meritorious defenses.
One classic situation involved a woman charged in a drug case
where conviction carried a mandatory minimum sentence of ten
years. The most incriminating piece of evidence was her statement
to undercover agents that she needed a "hand"-an ambiguous
enough expression interpreted by the agents to be a reference to
five kilos of drugs. Pre-Guidelines, the prosecutor and defense at-
torney would have litigated the defendant's state of mind in front
of a jury. But that turned out not to be a realistic option. For de-
spite her protestations of innocence, her lawyer counseled her to
stipulate to a factual basis for a finding of guilt and to plead guilty
to a count leaving open the possibility of probation. She decided
to enter the plea because she could not risk conviction and the cer-
tain consequence of leaving her children for a guaranteed mini-
mum period of incarceration of eight and a half years.
In another case a man was sentenced to twenty-four years af-
ter conviction of a drug offense. After the defendant had served
over two years of the sentence, the conviction was reversed when
the Ninth Circuit found that he had been denied a fair trial on sev-
eral grounds including the trial court's refusal to let him testify
with the aid of an interpreter as well as the introduction of im-
proper "other crimes" evidence. On remand, the prosecutor, un-
able to introduce the "other crimes" evidence as proof of the
original charges, added them as substantive counts, upping the
[Vol. 30:69
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ante to the extent that conviction would now carry a mandatory
life sentence. The defendant adamantly protested his innocence of
any wrongdoing. His lawyer, notwithstanding his own belief in his
client's innocence, was prepared to counsel the client to accept a
government offer to plead guilty to a significantly reduced charge
carrying a maximum sentence of three years-most of which he
had already served-simply because of the risk of the mandatory
life sentence upon conviction. Fortunately, and to the great credit
of the United States Attorney's Office, that choice never had to be
made because all the charges were dismissed after all the facts
were presented to that office. But had that unusual presentation
of evidence not been made to the prosecutor pre-trial, a grotesque
miscarriage of justice could well have occurred.
The 5K1 "cooperation" safety valve puts another unhealthy
spin on the Guidelines. In a multidefendant case, where the
prosecution needs the assistance of others for a successful prose-
cution, or even where, in a single defendant case, the client has in-
culpatory information about others, the first decision the defense
lawyer must make revolves around cooperation. No longer does
the lawyer spend his initial efforts in carefully examining the in-
dictment for infirmities and then exploring possible motions, de-
fenses, and evidentiary shortcomings in the government's case.
Now, the first concerns must be the ultimate Guidelines range and
the risks of going to trial. If the risks are too great, the lawyer
must make a beeline to the prosecutor's door to offer his client up
as a cooperator. For in a multidefendant case, the prosecutor may
only need one cooperator. If you are beaten to the prosecutor's
door by other defense counsel, your client may lose the opportu-
nity to win a 5K1 downward departure.
Here is an example. In a recent multimillion dollar fraud case,
the defendant was faced with these options:
(a) Go to trial and face a minimum eighteen year sen-
tence under the Guidelines upon conviction;
(b) Plead guilty to lesser offenses, stipulate to the appli-
cation of relevant Guidelines factors, and face a minimum
eight year sentence; or
(c) Plead guilty to the same charges as in (b) and, in ad-
dition, cooperate by testifying against other defendants,
thereby creating the possibility, if the prosecutor con-
cluded by the time of sentencing that the cooperation was
"significant," of a sentence under the Guidelines range,
November 1996]
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including straight probation.
One option not available to the defendant was to go to trial,
pursue what might be meritorious defenses, and if convicted, argue
as he would have before the Guidelines were enacted, that the cir-
cumstances peculiar to his case called for a sentence well below
the Guidelines range.
In this context, the defense lawyer has become a facilitator for
the prosecution rather than a zealous advocate for his client. It is
not surprising then that young defense lawyers have become frus-
trated and demeaned. Many come into the system soon after law
school with the spirit, resolve, and determination so necessary to
insure that our government not be able to take away a person's
liberty unless that person's lawyer has had the opportunity to put
vigorously the prosecution to the test of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. But the young lawyers learn after a short while that, for
many clients, there is little they can do to achieve results that seem
to be objectively rational and fair. The sense of hopelessness can
become overwhelming to the point that it compromises the law-
yer's dignity. Becoming frustrated is one thing. It comes with the
territory and can be dealt with. But a process which demeans is
inexcusable and must be changed.
This is not a time to become dispirited, but rather a time to dig
in with determination to get the system back on track. While it
may be a slow process, it has been happening for years now. The
lawyers leading the way are the public defenders and private de-
fense attorneys who struggle daily with resolve, grit, and good hu-
mor. They hammer away at inequities by proselytizing judges,
prosecutors, and probation officers, especially those who have re-
cently come into the criminal justice system. The imagination and
resourcefulness of these lawyers have slowly borne fruit, eventu-
ally creating the "hooks" on which courts have been able to ma-
neuver around the rules that would otherwise prevent them from
fairly resolving criminal cases.
I turn to the words of retired Supreme Court Justice William
J. Brennan, Jr. He has consistently, and with great eloquence, ar-
gued against the imposition of the death penalty as a violation of
basic human dignity.1 7 He played a major role in 1972 in declaring
it unconstitutional. " He wrote passionately in dissent just four
17. See e.g., cases cited infra notes 19-20.
18. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,257 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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years later as a newly composed Court found it constitutional.' 9
He continued his fierce opposition, filing dissents in over 1500
capital cases, until his retirement in 1990.2 In the face of the pub-
lic and official fervor to broaden the scope and accelerate the pace
of death row executions, he has never wavered in his belief that
unltimately they will be declared unconstitutional. As recently as
this past April, on the celebration of his ninetieth birthday, he fo-
cused again on the basic inhumanity of the death penalty, remind-
ing us that the pendulum will surely swing back again and that ul-
21timately reason will prevail. I trust that, in due course, the same
will also be said of the imbalance that now exists in our system of
criminal justice.
This may be a rough period of time in which to be a criminal
defense lawyer. More than ever there is a need for lawyers with a
strong resolve to take on the challenge to fight to better the sys-
tem. Justice Brennan said many years ago that there is nothing
more honorable that a lawyer can do than take on the representa-
tion of a criminal accused too poor to hire his own lawyer. It may
be more difficult these days to carry out that mission than it was in
the past, but it is no less honorable an undertaking. It will simply
take the collective commitment of criminal lawyers to continue to
zealously represent those accused of crime and to struggle to win
back a level playing field.
19. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,227 (1976) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
20. See e.g., Lowenfield v. Butler, 485 U.S. 995, 995 (1988) (Brennan, J. dissent-
ing); McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320 (1987) (Brennan, J. dissenting); Tison v.
Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 159 (1987) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
21. Lauren Neergaard, Brennan Slams Death Penalty at 90, CHARLESTON
SUNDAY GAZETTE MAIL, Apr. 26,1996, at 2C.
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